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This paper provides a search theoretical model that captures two phenomena that 
have characterized several episodes of monetary history: currency shortages and the 
circulation of privately issued notes. As usual in these models, the media of exchange 
are determined as part of the equilibrium. We characterize all the different equilibria 
and specify the conditions under which there is a currency shortage and/or privately 
issued notes are used as means of payment. There is multiplicity of equilibria for the 
entire parameter space, but there always exist an equilibrium in which notes circulate, 
either alone or together with coins. Hence, credit is a self-fulfilling phenomenon that 
depends on the beliefs of agents about the acceptability and future repayment of notes. 
The degree of circulation of coins depends on two crucial parameters, the intrinsic 
utility of holding coins and the extent with which it is possible to find exchange 
opportunities in the market. 
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  21. Introduction 
 
Economic historians have reported several episodes in which notes issued by 
individuals circulated and were generally accepted as payment for commercial 
transactions in such a way that they acted as substitutes of other media of exchange 
such as metal coins or notes issued by banks. Ashton (1945), for instance, analyzes the 
circulation of bills of exchange in Lancashire between 1790 and 1830.
1 He reports that 
“the bill had become more than a security for payment. The drawer very often passed it 
on to meet obligations of his own, and those who received it, in their turn, did the same. 
The bill was now a substitute for money” (Ashton, 1945, p.25). Cuadras-Morató and 
Rosés (1998) analyze a similar episode in Catalonia between 1844 and 1874. Butlin 
(1953) reports a different experience, this time located in Australia at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. Promissory notes were issued by individuals and circulated 
widely. He reports that “from the simple expedient of settling debts with promissory 
notes grew, in the first decade of the nineteenth century, the practice of regular issue by 
all and sundry of small notes, heterogeneous in form and often disreputable” (Butlin, 
1953, p.4). These promissory notes were written on any handy scrap of paper and 
accepted in the most casual manner and once issued remained in circulation for great 
lengths of time (see Butlin 1953, p.27). Notes were generally drawn in terms of money, 
although not necessarily (they could be payable in wheat or maize, for instance). Very 
                                                           
1 See also Schumpeter (1986), p.695 and Cameron (1967), chapter 2. 
  
  3often they were accepted only at a discount.
2 Needless to say, the circulation of this type 
of promissory notes was the origin of many frauds and litigations.
3 
 
There seems to be ample evidence that these private notes and other documents 
widely circulated because of the lack of better alternatives, especially metal coins and 
banknotes. In many cases gold and silver did not circulate because they were exported 
to finance international trade (this seems to be a common circumstance of many of these 
episodes) or used for purposes other than internal exchanges. Ashton (1945), for 
instance, states that bills of exchange circulated because of a need that arose “from an 
inadequate flow of silver from the Mint and from a poorly organized system of 
distribution: when the state fails in the elementary function of providing a proper supply 
of legal tender the community seeks to create a currency of its own” (Ashton, 1945, 
p.26). In Australia the extinction of this practice did not happen “until the 1830’s, when 
bank notes and English coins were in common use and cheque payments an everyday 
experience” (Butlin, 1953, p.68). In other words, once the monetary system was able to 
provide with satisfactory alternative means of payment, it was no longer necessary to 





                                                           
2 Examples of discounts reported in Butlin (1953), p. 97, for the period 1811-1815 have values between 
20% and 50%. 
  
3 A similar case is described in Sargent and Velde (2002), which refers to privately issued convertible 
tokens in England during the XVII and XVIII centuries and before the nationalization of the token 
coinage in 1817 (p. 261). 
  
4 See also Cuadras-Morató and Rosés (1998). 
 
5 Hanson (1979) is another illustration of the problem of shortages of specie, this time in Colonial 
America. He argues that the issue of notes by private merchants was one of the solutions to the problem 
suggested by contemporary observers. 
 
6 Murphy (1978) describes a more recent episode in Ireland where banks closed several times between 
1966 and 1976 and personal checks started circulating as media of exchange.  
  4This paper presents a search theoretical model that analyzes the coexistence and 
circulation of commodity money (metal coins) and credit (promissory notes) as means 
of payment. As it is customary in this type of models, all agents are specialized and 
must exchange with others in order to consume. In this particular model, agents have 
access to the possibility of issuing notes and buy consumption goods on credit. Once 
issued, these notes may circulate in the economy as media of exchange. Alternatively, 
agents may buy goods and pay for them with metal coins. We model these coins as 
intrinsically valuable (that is, money holders get utility out of the possession of coins). 
Obviously this should not be taken literally, as it is only meant to be a shortcut that 
allows us to capture the fact that coins may have alternative uses to paying for goods 
produced in the economy. For instance, in accordance with the historical episodes we 
have mentioned above, one could assume that coins could be used to pay for an 
imported consumption good produced by agents situated outside the economy. 
 
The search theoretical model of money seems particularly appropriate to analyze 
the issues of currency shortages and circulation of notes because it formalizes explicitly 
the trade frictions that motivate the emergence of different media of exchange in 
equilibrium. Furthermore, this modeling strategy has become standard in Monetary 
Economics and it seems important that more research is devoted to apply it to study 
specific historical events such as the one we are dealing with. 
 
One of the main purposes of the paper is to characterize all the existing 
equilibria of the model, which imply different degrees of circulation of coins and notes. 
Several results are worth mentioning. First, for some values of the parameters it will be 
the case that agents who hold coins do not want to spend them buying domestic goods 
  5and, consequently, there will be a shortage in the circulation of these coins. The key 
parameters to analyze will be the utility that money holders derive from possessing 
coins and the extent of exchange opportunities that can be found in the market. One of 
the main results of the model states that the larger is the utility that money holders 
derive from possessing coins, the more difficult will be their circulation and, 
consequently, the higher will be the likelihood that notes are the only possible means of 
exchange in the economy. For a given level of utility of holding money, however, the 
shortage of coins will depend on the amount of trade opportunities in the economy. One 
the one hand, if money is relatively valuable, money holders will keep it unless the 
trade opportunities they get by buying other assets, such as notes, are big enough. On 
the other hand, if money is of little value and exchange opportunities are relatively 
scarce, money holders will tend to be not very selective when they spend their coins 
because they need to take advantage of the few exchange opportunities they encounter. 
 
Second, for all values of the parameters there exists some equilibrium in which 
notes circulate. This confirms that credit is a self-fulfilling phenomenon. After all, the 
existence and circulation of credit depends on the fact that agents believe that it will be 
accepted by others and, eventually, repaid. Third, we show that the existence of credit is 
welfare enhancing for almost all values of the parameters. This is a natural result, given 
that credit in this model is a very efficient mechanism to overcome the trade frictions 
that characterize the economy. 
 
Formally, the model is based on previous developments of the search theoretic 
model of money. Shi (1996) is one of the first contributions to the joint analysis of 
money and credit in the context of search theory. There are two main differences with 
  6our analysis worth mentioning. First, the paper deals with fiat money (we consider 
commodity money instead), which makes it rather unsuitable to study currency 
shortages. Second, specific assumptions to simplify the model preclude the analysis of 
what it is one of our main concerns, namely, the circulation of promissory notes as 
means of payment in the economy. Li (2001) is specifically concerned with circulating 
notes in the context of a model with fiat money. Nevertheless, some of the results of the 
paper are a bit unsatisfactory from our point of view. In particular, it is necessary that a 
relatively large proportion of agents are holding money in order to have a monetary 
equilibrium with circulating notes. This is due to the fact that money is assumed to be 
the only way to repay debts in the economy. Also, the analysis in Li (2001) does not 
provide with general conditions for the existence of the main equilibrium and relies on 
numerical examples. We assume that debts can be repaid with notes, which simplifies 
the model a great deal and give us substantially different results. In our model the 
emergence of credit depends only on beliefs, which means that there exist equilibria 
with credit for the entire relevant parameter space. The nature of those equilibria differs 
in the degree of circulation of metal coins, which will depend on the values of the 
parameters, namely, the intrinsic value of money, the time preference of individuals, 
and the extent with which agents could meet exchange opportunities in the market. Our 
modeling of commodity money (coins) shares many features with the model presented 
in Velde, Weber and Wright (1999). In particular, we take from them the assumption of 
making money intrinsically valuable as a shortcut of a more sophisticated story that can 
justify shortages of coins. Wallace and Zhou (1997) study similar historical episodes, 
although they concentrate on the question of shortage of coins for certain transactions 
due to indivisibilities. Although we also assume that coins are indivisible, we focus on 




  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
basic model. Section 3 presents the main results on existence of equilibria. Section 4 
discusses welfare issues and Section 5 concludes with a short summary of the results 
and a few suggestions for future research. 
 
 
2. The model 
  
  Apart from a few changes in the environment that will be explained in detail 
below, we work with the same model as in Li (2001). 
 
2.1. The Environment. Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. There are N≥3 
distinct perishable and perfectly divisible consumption goods. There is a [0,1] 
continuum of infinitely lived agents, who are specialized in production and 
consumption with the following pattern: agents of type i consume good i and produce 
good i+1 (modulo N). The number of agents of each type is identical. This pattern of 
specialization means that consumption will not be possible without trade and direct 
barter is not feasible. Consumption of q units of good i yields utility u(q) to type i 
agents, while production of the same amount of units of good i+1 inflicts them with a 
cost of c(q) in terms of disutility. Without loss of generality, we normalize c(q)=q. The 
                                                           
7 The issues of circulation of notes and currency are also studied in a different category of models, 
characterized by private information, spatial separation and limited communication. Examples of this 
  8utility function is defined in the interval [0,∞). It is strictly increasing and twice 




*.  Agents maximize their lifetime expected discounted utility (with a 
common discount rate r). 
 
  Each period of time is divided into two different subperiods. The first is called 
the production subperiod. This is the time during which agents randomly meet other 
agents, have access to their production technology and make their exchange decisions. 
Goods produced during this subperiod must be consumed then or otherwise they perish. 
After this, it comes the repayment subperiod. During this subperiod no agent can 
produce but the agents who issued a note at some previous period are able to make 
contact with the agent who is holding that note (details about the issue and circulation 
of these notes are provided in section 2.2). It will be assumed that the repayment 
subperiod takes place immediately after the first subperiod and is extremely short and, 
hence, we can ignore discounting between both subperiods. 
 
  There is not a centralized trading place for goods in this economy and, during 
the production subperiod, agents randomly search and meet in pairs to carry out 
exchanges of goods and assets. Each period agents encounter potential trading partners 
according to a Poisson process with constant arrival rate β>0. They can perfectly 
observe all agents’ type and inventory holdings (that is, whether they are holding 
nothing or some asset).  Given this, agents will make decisions about production, 
exchange of goods and assets, and consumption. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
kind of models are Townsend and Wallace (1987), Bernhardt (1989), Townsend (1989), and Bullard and 
Smith (2003a). 
  9 
 2.2.  Money and Credit. There are potentially two different assets in this 
economy, money and credit, both perfectly storable. For tractability we will assume, 
first, that assets are indivisible
8 and, second, that individuals cannot hold more than one 
unit of either asset. In contrast with the setting in Li (2001), money in this model is 
commodity money (metal coins, for instance). We shall assume that, although money 
cannot be directly consumed by anyone, agents who hold money enjoy a stream of 
direct utility γ (γ>0). This is, as in Velde et al. (1999), a reduced form to model the fact 
that there are alternative uses to coins other than paying for goods in the economy. They 
describe a situation in which agents derive utility from consuming a good that is 
produced outside the economy and must be paid with metallic coins.
9 
10 
11 The economy 
begins with a proportion M of agents holding one unit of money. These agents are 
equally distributed among agents of each type. M  is also the proportion of the 
population that is holding in inventory a unit of money at any moment in time. These 
agents will be called money holders. 
                                                           
8 In fact, indivisibility of coins was historically one the main causes of shortages of currency. As  Wallace 
and Zhou (1997) put it, “shortage observations can be explained by the fact that the available currency 
could not be divided into smaller units” (p. 556). See also Sargent and Velde (2002). 
 
9 To keep the amount of money constant, we suppose that there is also a good that is exported so that 
trade is balanced and coins are also flowing into the economy.  
 
10 Historical references give some credit to this story. In Australia, for instance, this is the period when a 
very strong prohibition of exporting coins, which apparently was the major cause of the existing currency 
shortage, was established (see Butlin, 1953). See also Cuadras-Morató and Rosés (1998), p.32-33 for a 
review of a similar example for the case of Catalonia during the XIXth century. Based on an analysis of 
the Canadian case, Redish (1984) attributes the specie scarcity more to the currency laws in use during 
the Colonial period (1796-1830) than to an external drain due to the finance of imports. 
 
11 Related with this, see Jin and Temzelides (2004). They study the coexistence of fiat money and credit 
in a model in which agents live in different locations, meet more frequently with residents of their own 
location and public record-keeping of agents’ trading histories exists only at the local level. One of the 
main results of the paper is reminiscent of the assumption we maintain: while credit transactions may take 
place among neighbors who interact with high probability, only monetary transactions occur among 
agents who live far apart (and whose frequency of meetings is relatively low). 
 
  10 
  There could also be credit in this economy. In some meetings (details will be 
provided below) some agents decide to produce to get in exchange a document (also 
denoted as note or IOU) issued by their trade counterparts. The former become 
creditors and the latter will be called debtors. This note is a contract by which the agent 
who issues it promises to pay one unit of some asset in the future. Nothing prevents the 
creditors from circulating this IOU in exchange for goods or other assets. An IOU is put 
out of circulation when the debtor repays her debt.
12 In order to do this, the debtor must 
produce goods and exchange them for some asset in the production subperiod and, then, 
swap it for the IOU she issued in the past in the repayment subperiod. In order to make 
this possible, we assume that there is a centralized location where debtors and creditors 
can meet during the repayment period. Back in the production subperiod, agents who 
met in this centralized location have no way to find each other again.
13 Notice that our 
setting allows that debt is used to repay debt, while Li (2001) assumes that only money 
or goods can be used to repay debt. Once the debt is considered repaid, the note is 
destroyed, and the debtor becomes producer. For now, producers will be characterized 
simply as those agents who do not hold money and are neither debtors nor creditors. In 
order to ensure that debt will always be repaid, we assume that all agents can coordinate 
to deny access to consumption to those debtors who have not repaid their debts.
14 This 
sets a limit of one to the credit an agent can receive. 
 
                                                           
12 To avoid possible confusions, we shall use the following convention: the debtor will be “she” and the 
creditor will be “he”. 
 
13 For a somewhat similar model with two subperiods with very different environments, see Lagos and 
Wright (2004). 
 
  11  There are not restrictions on the circulation of debt in this economy. Thus, 
creditors can use the IOU they have in inventory to trade. Before a debt is repaid, it 
could happen that a creditor passes the note to another agent who, in exchange, gives 
him a consumption good and/or a coin. That agent who buys the IOU becomes the new 
creditor. As we have assumed, when debtors eventually acquire an asset with which to 
repay the debt, they will always be able to contact with the agent who is holding the 
note during the repayment subperiod. 
 
 2.3.  Potential trades. When a period of time t starts all the agents belong to one 
of the following categories: money holders (hold money in inventory), creditors (hold 
an IOU in inventory), debtors (have issued an IOU and have not repaid it yet), and 
producers (the rest of agents). Throughout the paper, we will assume that the particular 
category to which each agent pertains is common knowledge. In particular, potential 
buyers who are paired with potential sellers can always distinguish between debtors and 
producers. The measure of agents who is in each of the previous states is, respectively, 
M, Pc, Pd, and Pp. Taking M as given, and taking into account that 1-M=Pc+Pd+Pp and 
that, by definition, Pc=Pd, we can summarize the distribution of states of agents simply 
by Pc. Agents are randomly matched in pairs. In order to have trade, it is first necessary 
that there is single coincidence of wants (the producer produces what the consumer 
wants to buy). Given that this condition holds, the following are the possible situations 
in which production, trade and consumption take place. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
14 Alternatively, it could be assume that there exists a legal system that costlessly enforces repayment of 
debt, as in Diamond (1990). 
  12  A debtor might want to produce and exchange whenever she is matched with an 
agent who holds an asset (money holders and creditors) with which she will be able to 
repay her debt. Debtors might also produce and exchange when they meet a producer. 
In this case the producer will issue an IOU to pay for the good. Once the debtors get one 
unit of an asset (money or IOU), they will enter the repayment subperiod and repay 
their debts. Notice that, since production takes place during the production subperiod 
and goods, which are perishable, cannot be carried into the repayment subperiod, the 
only way to repay a debt is with assets. In other words, it is not feasible to repay a debt 
with goods. 
 
  Producers may be willing to produce when they meet money holders who pay 
with money, creditors who pay with second hand debt and other producers who pay 
with a newly issued IOU. Creditors might want to use the notes they have in inventory 
to buy goods from both producers and debtors. If they meet money holders, they could 
sell their IOU in exchange for money. Assuming that creditors accept money to cancel 
debts means that holding coins has to be better than holding an IOU. This implies that 
money holders will only be willing to exchange money for an IOU if, on top of it, they 
get some amount of their consumption good. Any agent holding a note at the end of the 
production subperiod (creditor) will enter the repayment subperiod in which he could be 
given one unit of an asset as means of canceling the debt. This will depend on whether 
the debtor who issued the IOU he is holding has been able to produce and exchange in 
order to get that asset. These are all the possible exchanges in this economy. Debtors 
will never act as buyers, since they will be denied consumption until they have repaid 
their debts. Also, money holders and creditors will never exchange as producers, 
because there is a limit of one unit of assets they can hold in storage that they have 
  13already reached. The only exception to this is that creditors may be willing to exchange 
their notes plus some consumption goods in exchange for coins. Finally, both creditors 
and money holders will be assumed to never issue debt to pay for consumption goods. If 
they did, they would have an incentive to cancel their debt immediately with the assets 
they were holding in the first place and, consequently, the final outcome would be 
exactly the same. This means that we do not need to worry about the possibility of 
credit chains (i.e., an agent being creditor and debtor at a time) developing in this 
economy. 
 
Notice that money holders are the only group of agents who will never produce 
in this economy. In this particular sense, we can interpret the parameter 1-M as a 
measure of the extent with which an agent will meet exchange opportunities in the 
market.  
 
  2.4. Bargaining and Value functions. The terms of trade, that is, the number of 
units of good that change hands in each trade, are determined by a bargaining process 
between buyers and sellers in which we will assume that buyers make take-it-or-leave-it 
offers (TIOLIO). Thus, every time there is a possibility of trade, the buyer proposes an 
amount of goods that make the seller indifferent between producing or not. This simply 
means that the buyers get the whole surplus generated by trade. Let qhj be the amount of 
units of a consumption good exchanged when h is the buyer and j acts as the seller 
(h,j=p,m,c,d). The subscripts p, m, c, and d stand for, respectively, producer, money 
holder, creditor, and debtor. Table 1 summarizes the previous discussion on potential 
trades and terms of trade. 
  14 
Table 1. Exchange Patterns 
AGENT WHO PRODUCES 
 




  *  qpd  * 
CREDITOR  qcp  *  qcd  * 
















* denotes that no trade takes place in the meeting 
qhj denotes the amount of goods produced and exchanged in each of the meetings  
 
Next, we define Vk (k=p,m,c,d) as the expected discounted lifetime utility from 
beginning a period in state k, and let Vsc be the value of entering the repayment period 
as a creditor. Let λhj be the probability that a buyer h wants to buy from a seller j. The 
following Bellman equations for producers, debtors, creditors, and money holders 
summarize the previous discussion about the trades that could take place in this 
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Expression (1), for instance, means the following. A producer meets an agent 
who is willing to consume her production good (single coincidence of wants) with 
probability 1/N. Then, with probability Mλmp she meets a money holder who is willing 
to exchange his cash for the good she produces. Her payoff in this case would be –
qmp+Vm. With probability Ppλpp, she meets another producer who is willing to take her 
production good in exchange for a newly issued IOU. The payoff is now –qpp+Vc. 
Similarly, with probability Pcλcp she meets a creditor who is willing to take her 
production good in exchange for an IOU he got from a previous trade, resulting in a 
payoff –qcp+Vsc. Also, a producer meets an agent who produces her consumption good 
with probability 1/N. If it is a producer (with probability Pp), then she has to decide 
whether to accept that good, consume it and become a debtor (the payoff is u(qpp)+Vd). 
It could also be a debtor (with probability Pd). The decision to be taken then is 
analogous, and the payoff u(qpd)+Vd. The rest of possible encounters would not result in 
  16any trade for the producer. The other expressions can be interpreted in a very similar 
fashion. 
 
The TIOLIO assumption gives us the following terms of trade, which will simplify 
the previous Bellman equations: 
 
(6)  qmd=qpd=qcd=qd=Vp-Vd 
(7)  qmp=Vm-Vp 
(8)  qpp=Vc-Vp 
(9)  qcp=Vsc-Vp 
(10) qmc=Vm-Vsc 
 
The meaning of these expressions should be obvious. For instance, expression (6) 
means that debtors are indifferent between producing in exchange for assets, repaying 
their debts and becoming producers (-qd+Vp) or continue as debtors (Vd). Similar 
arguments apply to the rest of the expressions. 
 
  Notice that (6) and (2) imply that Vd=0 and, hence, Vp=qd. Then, substituting in 
(7) and (8), Vm=qmp+qd and Vc=qpp+qd. Also, qcp=Mλmdqmp+(1-Mλmd)qpp and qmc=(1-
Mλmd)(qmp-qpp). If we assume that creditors accept to be repaid with money, then Vm≥Vc. 
This implies that qmp≥qpp, which in turn means qmc≥0 and qmp≥qcp≥qpp. The former 
inequality signifies that creditors will be willing to produce positive amounts of goods 
to acquire money. The latter means that buying with one unit of money is cheaper than 
buying with an old note, which in turn is cheaper than buying with a newly issued note. 
  17Thus, nobody who has money has any interest in issuing debt. Also, old debt sells at a 
premium with respect to newly issued debt.
15 
 
 2.5.  Incentive compatibility conditions. Under the TIOLIO assumption, would-
be producers are always given offers that make them indifferent between producing or 
not. It is buyers who make the exchange decision. Buyers will only be willing to carry 
out the trade if they get a positive surplus out of it. This can be expressed in the form of 
the following incentive compatibility conditions. 
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15 This is largely an artifact of the assumptions on the timing of the model. Old debt can always be repaid 
in the immediate repayment subperiod if debtors get assets with which to do it. New debt, instead, will 
never be paid sooner than in the next period if the debtors can get then the assets with which they can 
settle the contract. 
  18Expression (11) (similarly for the rest of incentive compatibility conditions) means that 
money holders are willing to buy from producers if the utility they get from consuming 
qmp plus the value of becoming producers [u(qmp)+Vp= u(qmp)+qd] is at least as big as 
the value of holding one unit of money (Vm=qmp+qd). 
 
 
  3. Equilibrium 
 
  The steady-state distribution of this economy, Pc, is described by the following 
equations: 
 
  1-M=Pc+Pd+Pp        ( 1 8 )  
 P c=Pd          ( 1 9 )  
 P d(Mλmd+Pcλcd+Ppλpd)=Pp(Ppλpp+Pdλpd)     (20) 
 
Equations (18) and (19) are identities. Equation (20) simply equates the outflows from 
the debtor state to the inflows into it. As it should be clear, the λ’s suffice to determine 
the steady-state. 
 
  The main concern of the paper will be the analysis of pure-strategy equilibria. 
For reasons of simplicity, we will not refer to mixed-strategy equilibria. 
 
  Definition of equilibrium. A pure-strategy equilibrium is a pair (λhj,qhj) that 
satisfies the Bellman equations (1)-(5), the terms of trade (6)-(10), and the incentive 
compatibility conditions (11)-(17). 
  19   
  There are two broad classes of equilibria. First, we shall define the No-Trade 
Equilibrium,  characterized by the fact that agents do not exchange with each other 
(autarky). This is defined as an equilibrium in which λpp=λmp=0.  Trade Equilibria 
happen whenever λpp  and/or  λmp are different from zero. Agents in this kind of 
equilibria are able to produce, trade and consume thanks to the circulation of money 
and/or notes as media of exchange. In order to characterize these different equilibria we 
will proceed as follows: given λhj and the corresponding Pc, solve the Bellman 
equations (1)-(5) for qhj and check the values of the parameters for which the incentive 
compatibility conditions (11)-(17) hold. For those parameter values, (λhj,qhj) constitutes 
an equilibrium. 
 
  We will first describe the No-Trade Equilibrium (Equilibrium N). Let 
λpp=λmp=0. Neither money, nor credit circulates in this economy. It is straightforward 
to prove the following lemma. 
 




The intuitions for this result are clear: if the utility stream generated by the 
possession of money is high enough, money holders will never want to give money 
away and, consequently, it will be impossible to have money that circulates in this 
economy. On its part, the absence of credit in the economy is a self-fulfilling 
phenomenon. If agents think that debt will not be repaid, then nobody will engage in a 
debt contract in the first place. 
  20 
  Let us now describe the Trade Equilibria. We shall begin with equilibria in 
which λmp=1, and, consequently, there is money circulating as medium of exchange. 
First of all, there is an equilibrium in which there is not credit circulating (λpp=0) 
together with money (Equilibrium ME). While the reason for not having credit is 
exactly the same as before, the feature that allows money to be an active medium of 
exchange is that now the utility stream derived from the possession of money is 
relatively small and, consequently, now money holders are willing to spend it to acquire 
valuable consumption goods. The following lemma establishes this result. 
 
  Lemma 2. For all M∈(0,1), Equilibrium ME exists iff γ/r<q
*. 
 
  The next possibilities we want to examine are those in which, together with 
monetary exchange (λmp=1), there exists the possibility of buying goods with credit 
(λpp=1). The following lemma will be very useful to characterize these equilibria with 
credit. 
 
Lemma 3. Given λpp=λcp=λpd=λcd=1 and λmd=0, there exist an equilibrium in 
which qpp< qd<q
*, provided that r and M are not too big. 
 
Proof. Substituting for the values of λ’s in equations (18)-(20), we can establish 
the result that Pc=Pd=Pp=(1-M)/3. The Bellman equations (1) and (3) can now be 
written as: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
16 Proofs of most of all the lemmas in this section are relegated to the Appendix. 
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This means that there exist qd, qpp such that 0<qpp<qd<q
*. 
Notice that λpp=1 is satisfied iff u(qpp)>qd, which means that 











3 ) 1 ( 2
) 1 ( 2
. This is not true if either r or M have very large values.   
 
Notice that qd and qpp are the solutions of a system of equations formed by (21) 
and (22). Their value depends exclusively on r and M. This is a system of non-linear 
equations and we cannot get closed form solutions for the values of the unknowns. The 
lemma, however, guarantees that these solutions exist. 
 
To be clear about the intuition of these results, we could ask why r and M cannot 
be too big to ensure that there is credit. That r is not too big means that agents are not 
  22very impatient (i.e. they do not discount the future a lot). This is important for agents to 
agree to buy on credit that has to be returned later. Notice that if r=0, then qpp=qd. The 
bigger r is, the bigger is qd relative to qpp, or in other words, the bigger is the cost of 
repayment of debts compared with the amount of goods one can buy on credit. Once qd 
got a lot bigger than qpp, nobody wants to buy on credit. What about M? If M is big, 
agents do not want to buy on credit. The reason for this is that if M is very big, then qpp 
is very small (in the limit when M=1, qpp=0). Remember that qpp is the amount that 
makes the seller indifferent between producing and selling for a note or not, qpp=Vc-Vp. 
This is a small amount when M is big because in that case producers may have, as 
alternative, a lot of potential money holders to whom they can sell if λmp=1 and, 
besides, because the value of becoming a creditor, Vc, is small because the producers or 
debtors to whom the note can be passed are very few and, moreover, eventual 
repayment of the debt will never take place with money (this is because λmd=0). 
 
Our next task will be to find which of the possible combinations of λ’s may 
constitute equilibrium. Clearly, λmp=1 (and, consequently, q
*>qmp) implies λmc=1 (see 
(15)) and λcp=1 (see (16)). Suppose λpd=0. Then, q
*<qd (see (13)). Given the results 
from Lemma 3, qd>u(qpp)>qpp, which is a contradiction with our assumption λpp=1. 
This means that if λpp=1, then λpd=1. In words, this means that if producers are willing 
to issue an IOU to buy from other producers an amount qpp, they should also be willing 
to issue an IOU to buy from debtors a larger amount of goods qd. This is quite an 
intuitive result. Notice that, for a debtor, the alternative to produce is to stay as a debtor, 
which has zero value (Vd=0). For a producer the alternative is to stay as a producer, 
which has a positive value. Under TIOLIO, the amount produced by debtors that leaves 
  23them indifferent between producing and not producing, qd, will be bigger than the 
amount produced by the producers, qpp. Finally, suppose λmd=1. This implies that λcd=1 
(see (14) and (17)). Thus, we have λmp=λpp=λmc=λcp=λpd=λmd=λcd=1. This is an 
equilibrium in which there is complete circulation of money and credit (that is, coins 
and notes always buy goods and also coins buy IOUs from creditors). This will be 
denoted as Equilibrium MC(1). 
 
  Suppose now that λmd=0 and λcd=1. We then have an equilibrium defined by 
λmp=λpp=λmc=λcp=λpd=λcd=1 and λmd=0. This is an equilibrium in which notes always 
buy goods. Money, though, has a more restricted circulation, because money holders do 
not buy goods from debtors (λmd=0). Notice that in this equilibrium, necessarily qmp>qd. 
What happens in this case is that qd is relatively small, so that money holders will not 
spend their coins buying from debtors. This will be called Equilibrium MC(2). 
 
  To extinguish the possibilities of equilibria when λmp=λpp=1, let us suppose that 
λmd=0 and λcd=0. This means that qpp>u(qd). Also, from Lemma 3, qd>qpp. But this is 
contradictory with λpd=1. Intuitively, it is easy to explain why this is so: if the 
producers buy from a debtor, then the creditors should also buy from a debtor. This is 
because the opportunity cost is identical in both cases, qpp=qcp. Summing up, no 
equilibrium other than MC(1) and MC(2) exists in which both money and IOUs buy 
goods. 
 
  Within the category of trade equilibria, let us look now into the possibility of 
λmp=0 and λpp=1 (money does not buy goods from producers, but credit does). If we 
  24suppose that λpd=1, then this, together with λmp=0, implies that u(qd)<qmp, so λmd=0. 
Next, we suppose λcd=1. This means that u(qd)>qpp. Then, necessarily, q
*>qpp and 
u(qpp)>qpp, which means that λcp=1. If we finally suppose that λmc=1, then we have an 
equilibrium in which λmp=λmd=0 and λpp=λpd=λcd=λcp=λmc=1. This is Equilibrium 
CM. It is characterized by the fact that credit circulates completely and money 
circulates only because money holders accept to exchange money for an IOU. Notice 
that in this equilibrium money acts only as a settlement device of credit contracts. 
 
  What happens if we suppose λmc=0 instead? The new equilibrium can be 
described by λmp=λmd=λmc=0 and λpp=λpd=λcd=λcp=1. This is called Equilibrium C. 
Only credit circulates in this equilibrium. Money holders are never willing to give away 
coins in exchange for either goods or other assets. 
 
  This completes the catalogue of possible equilibria of this model. In order to see 
that there are no other possibilities, let us see what happen when we assume differently 
than above. For instance, given λmp=0, λpp =1 and λpd =1, let us suppose that λcp=0 (so 
qpp>q
*). Then, clearly qpp>u(qd) which implies that λcd =0. But then, by (3), Vc=0 and if 
the value of being a creditor is zero, it does not make any sense to incur in a cost –qpp to 
change from being a producer to being a creditor (by TIOLIO –qpp+Vc-Vp=0). 
Producers would only accept to produce in exchange for credit if qpp<0, that is, if 
instead of incurring a cost of production they were given a production subsidy. This 
cannot be equilibrium. 
 
  25  If we suppose λcd =0 and λcp =1, from the Bellman equations (1) and (3) we 
have 
[ ] [ ]
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Operating, we get  [] [ ] pp d p d d d pp q q P q q u P rq − = − + ) ( , which, since λpd=1, is positive. 
This means that qd>qpp and also u(qd)>qpp. This, however, contradicts λcd=0. Hence, 
this is not equilibrium. Finally, given λmp =0 and λpp =1, let us suppose λpd =0. Then 
qpp>qd>q
*. This implies u(qd)<qmp and, consequently, λmd =0. Also λcp =0 and λcd =0. 
By (3), this means Vc=0 and, as we have seen above, this is incompatible with an 
equilibrium in which λpp =1. 
 
  The previous discussion will be summarized in the following proposition: 
 
  Proposition 1. Only the following equilibria may exist in this economy: 
-  Equilibrium N: λmp =0 and λpp =0. 
-  Equilibrium ME: λmp =1 and λpp =0. 
-  Equilibrium MC(1): λmp=λpp=λmc=λcp=λpd=λmd=λcd=1. 
-  Equilibrium MC(2): λmd=0 and λmp=λpp=λmc=λcp=λpd=λcd=1. 
-  Equilibrium CM: λmp=λmd=0 and λpp=λpd=λcd=λcp=λmc=1. 
-  Equilibrium C: λmp=λmd=λmc=0 and λpp=λpd=λcd=λcp=1. 
 
We are now ready to present a few more results that define the parameter space 
for which the different equilibria exist. 
 




Lemma 5. Provided that r and M are not too big, 
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 are necessary conditions for existence of Equilibrium 
CM. 
 
Although the conditions given in the previous lemma are not sufficient, it is 
possible to check numerically that the equilibrium CM exists for all the points of the 
parameter space defined by them. Also notice that equilibria C and CM will not coexist 
for any values of the parameters. 
 
Lemma 6. Equilibrium MC(2) exists iff 
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 for values of the 
parameters such that r and M are not too big. 
 
Notice that if agents are very impatient, that is, r is very big, then money holders 
will prefer to buy goods from debtors than waiting for better deals to come. This is so 
even if debtors produce a relatively little amount in exchange for a unit of money. 
Similarly, if M is very big, then the chances for money holders to find valuable 
exchange opportunities to spend their money are very scarce and, consequently, they 
  27will also be willing to buy goods from debtors (even though the amount of goods they 
get from those is relatively small). 
 
All that is left to have a complete characterization of the existence of 
equilibrium is to define the region of the parameter space for which equilibrium MC(1) 
exists. Due to the particular form that the Bellman equations (1)-(5) take in this 
equilibrium, it is very cumbersome to find analytical expressions for this and, 
consequently, we revert to numerical examples. Intuitively, equilibrium MC(1) should 
be confined to a region of the parameter space (γ,M) placed in the southeast of Figure 1 
(which was drawn for values of r=0.01 and a quadratic utility function). For instance, it 
can be shown that equilibrium MC(1) exists for values of the parameters r=0.01, 
γ=0.002, and M=0.98. Notice that, given a particular value of r, this equilibrium exists 
for particularly high values of M, precisely the values for which equilibrium MC(2) can 
be shown not to exist. 
 
All these existence results can be summarized in the following proposition (and 
Figure 1). 
 
Proposition 2. Provided that r and M are not too big, we can state the following 
results: a) Equilibrium N exists for values of the parameters such that γ/r>q
*; b) 
Equilibrium ME exists for values of the parameters such that γ/r<q
*; c) Equilibrium C 
exists for values of the parameters such that γ/r>q
*+qd(r,M)+qpp(r,M); d) Equilibrium 
CM  exists for values of the parameters such that 
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  28 d)  Equilibrium  MC(2) exists for values of the parameters such that 
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; e) Equilibrium MC(1) 
exists for values of the parameters placed in the southeast corner of the parameter space 
drawn in Figure 1 (for instance, Equilibrium MC(1) exists for values of the parameters 
r=0.01,  γ=0.002, and M=0.98); and f) these are the only equilibria of the model 











[PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
In the model a shortage of coins corresponds to a situation in which money 
holders do not spend their coins to buy either goods or notes and rather keep them. The 
different equilibria of the model can be characterized by an index 
 that measures the incidence of currency shortages. For the 
different equilibria of the model is easy to show that, from more to less acute degree of 
shortage the value of s is sN=sC=0, sCM=1/3, sMC(2)=2/3, and sME=sMC(1)=1. In other 
words, equilibria N and C correspond to situations in which coins do not circulate at all, 
equilibria ME and MC(1) to situations in which money holders are always willing to 
spend their coins to buy consumption goods and notes and, finally, equilibria CM and 
MC(2) correspond to intermediate situations.  
 
It is interesting to discuss existence of the different equilibria and their 
characteristics in relation to the two parameters plotted in Figure 1: the intrinsic value 
of money, γ, and the amount of money holders in the economy, M. The latter is, by no 
  29means, equivalent to the amount of money that actually circulates in the economy. For 
our purposes, it is convenient to interpret M as the absence of exchange opportunities in 
the economy, since the higher is the number of money holders, the lower will be the 
likelihood of meeting someone from whom to get goods (producers and debtors) or 
goods and notes (creditors). 
 
Figure 1 shows that there are two different types of equilibria for all values of 
the parameter space: one of them without credit (for small values of γ, ME, and for 
higher values of γ, N ); and the other one with notes circulating (C, CM, MC(2) or 
MC(1)). Thus, the first aspect we want to emphasize is that credit emerges as a purely 
self-fulfilling phenomenon in our model. After all, the existence and circulation of 
credit only depends on the fact that agents believe that this credit will be accepted by 
others and, eventually, repaid. Consequently, there exist some equilibrium in which 
credit circulates for all values of the parameters. This contrasts with the results obtained 
in Shi (1996) and Li (2001). In these papers a monetary equilibrium with credit exists 
only when the parameter M is high enough. The reason for this result is their common 
assumption that money is the only way to repay debts. As a consequence, credit only 
appears if the proportion of agents who hold money is high enough. 
 
Second, when credit does not emerge in this economy, the parameter space can 
be divided into two well-defined regions. For high enough values of γ ( γ>rq
*) 
commodity money is very valuable and does not circulate because money holders prefer 
to keep it. The only equilibria in this case is N (autarky). In this situation there is a 
serious shortage of coins because money holders decide to keep them completely away 
from the internal market. This implies that, unless some form of credit appears, no 
  30exchange will take place at all. On the other hand, when the intrinsic value of money is 
low enough (γ<rq
*), the unique equilibrium is ME, in which the only media of 
exchange are coins. Obviously, there is not shortage of coins in this case and money 
holders are always willing to spend their currency for consumption goods, 
independently of the value of the parameter M. This equilibrium is identical to the 
monetary equilibrium without credit in Shi (1996) and Li (2001). Both papers deal with 
fiat money, which can be considered a particular case in our model when γ=0. 
 
Finally we also analyze existence of all the equilibria with circulation of notes in 
the same parameter space (γ,M). First, when γ is very big, money holders do not spend 
money at all and the resulting equilibrium is always C. Notes are the only possible way 
of alleviating the currency shortage in this situation and the only alternative to this is the 
equilibrium without exchange, N. As γ gets smaller the equilibrium will also depend on 
M. For values of γ quite big, if M is small, spending money to buy notes is the best 
strategy (equilibrium CM). The reasons for this are, first, that money holders get some 
amount of consumption good when they buy notes and, second, that there are still lots 
of exchange opportunities in the economy which can be taken advantage of if one is 
holding notes. For bigger values of M, though, it is better to keep the coins (equilibrium 
C) because the immediate reward of consumption does not compensate for the lack of 
exchange opportunities of those who hold notes. As γ keeps going down, for relatively 
small values of M the best strategy is still to buy notes with coins, but for bigger values 
of M now the best money holders can do is to spend the money less selectively, buying 
both notes and goods from producers (equilibrium MC(2)). Notice the asymmetry in the 
appearance of currency shortages in the model: when the intrinsic value of money is 
  31relatively high, big M means that it is a good idea to keep the money which then does 
not circulate. Since there are not good opportunities for exchange, holding money is the 
best strategy. When money is less valuable, however, a high value for M gives 
incentives to money holders to spend it rapidly because they want to take advantage of 
the few exchange opportunities they encounter. Obviously, the degree of shortage of 
coins is lower in the latter case. Finally, when γ is very small, we have three different 
regions depending on the values for M. For small values we have, as before, equilibrium 
CM. Notice that, as far as M is low enough and there is credit in the economy, not 
matter how low the intrinsic value of coins is, they are never exchanged for 
consumption goods. For higher values of M we have, as before, equilibrium MC(2), so 
the coins are spent less selectively. Finally, for very high values of M we have that 
money holders decide to spend their coins in all possible situations, so they buy notes 
and goods from producers as well as from debtors (equilibrium MC(1)). These three 





The following lines present some welfare results derived from the model. The 










E. (E={N,ME,CM,C,MC(1),MC(2)}). This variable measures the long-run 
expected utility of a representative agent, not conditional on her current state. 
 
For values of the parameters such that γ/r>q
*, the existing equilibria can be 
ranked according to the welfare criterion. The main analytical result of this section is 
  32that the No-Trade Equilibrium  N has always a lower welfare than any other trade 
equilibria with which it coexists. 
 
Proposition 3. If γ/r>q
*, W
) 2 ( , ,
MC CM C N W W W <  
 
Proof. See Appendix.  
 
The No-Trade Equilibrium is always dominated by any trade equilibrium with 
which it coexists. The presence of credit and the circulation of money improve the 
efficiency of any economy when comparing with the no-trade situation. Intuitively, the 
no-trade equilibrium is always dominated by any other equilibrium in which money 
holders do at least as well as in the no-trade equilibrium and the non-money holders see 
that some trade opportunities are created by the circulation of media of exchange (coins 
or notes). 
 
  On the other side, if γ/r<q
*, then no general analytical result can be presented 
but we can construct numerical results to illustrate the welfare implications of the 
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. Clearly, non-money holders are 
better off in both equilibria CM and MC(2) (see Proof of Proposition 3). Money holders, 
however, are not unambiguously better off in those equilibria. Moreover, we cannot 
generally rank these equilibria in terms of W. 
  





ME. This means that for most values of the parameters, 
equilibria with circulation of notes is welfare superior to a situation in which credit does 
not exist and notes do not circulate. The only exceptions to this general rule are cases in 
which M is very high. In those cases, the equilibrium without credit is better than the 
equilibria with credit. This is because credit displaces production opportunities, so the 
emergence of credit creates a trade-off because it allows more exchanges but, at the 
same time, reduces the number of producers with whom money holders can be paired 
(credit crowds out production). This outcome is due to the particular assumptions of the 
model, in particular the assumption of unitary inventories.
17 
 
  These welfare results confirm that the existence of credit and the circulation of 
notes enhances welfare in almost all situations and, in that respect, are not different 
from those obtained in the models by Shi (1996) and Li (2001). This is not surprising, 
given that credit here is an efficient exchange mechanism that helps to overcome trade 
frictions and allows a larger amount of exchanges. We have to bear in mind, however, 
that our modeling strategy is extremely simple and assumes away from complications 
such as the possibility of default, asymmetries of information, notes of different quality, 
possibility of counterfeiting, etc. which would inevitably alter this result.  
 
 
  5. Concluding remarks 
  
                                                           
17 A very similar result arises in Li (2001) for identical reasons. 
  34  This paper provides a search theoretical monetary model that captures two 
phenomena that have jointly characterized several episodes of monetary history: 
currency shortages and the circulation of privately issued notes. As it is customary in 
this type of models, the media of exchange used by the agents to complete their 
economic transactions are determined as part of the equilibria. We provide the 
characterization of all the different equilibria of the model and specify the conditions 
under which there is a currency shortage and/or privately issued notes are used as means 
of payment. There is multiplicity of equilibria for all the values of the parameters, but 
some equilibrium in which notes circulate, either as the only medium of exchange or 
together with metal coins, always exist. Hence, credit is a self-fulfilling phenomenon 
that depends on the beliefs of agents about acceptability and future repayment of notes. 
The degree of circulation of coins depends on two crucial parameters, namely, the 
intrinsic utility of holding coins and the extent to which it is possible to find exchange 
opportunities in the market. If money is very valuable, then coins do not circulate and 
notes are the only possible way to alleviate trade frictions. As money becomes less 
valuable, the circulation of coins depends also on the trade opportunities available to the 
money holders. In general terms, the circulation of notes is shown to be welfare 
improving.  
 
  There are several obvious shortcomings of our analysis that surely deserve 
further research. For instance, we do not deal in this paper with the issue of 
asymmetries of information, which is crucial for the analysis of credit and the 
circulation of private notes. Another important subject we also leave aside of the 
analysis of the paper is the modeling of financial intermediaries. Although our model 
takes credit into consideration, it would be interesting to consider a different model in 
  35which trade frictions gave rise to an endogenous role for financial intermediation and 
consider how this would affect the circulation of private debt and currency.
18 
 
  On a more general level, our research raises several questions that affect the 
historical interpretation of important macroeconomic relationships. First, there is the 
general question of which is the relevant definition of money supply for the historical 
period previous to the formation of modern Central Banks and monetary policy as we 
know them today. Second, and somehow related to the previous point, it is true that, 
although from a macroeconomic theory point of view, it seems clear that falling prices 
should alleviate a currency shortage, there is some evidence that at least in some 
economies, agents reacted also creating alternative media of exchange. This may be 
related to some notion of price rigidity that it is worth considering. It seems to us that 




  Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. In  Equilibrium N,  λpp=λmp=0 and then Vp=0  and 
Vm=qmp=γ/r. The incentive compatibility condition for λmp to be zero implies that 
qmp>q
* and, consequently, equilibrium exists if γ/r>q
*.   
 
                                                           
18 Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) and Williamson (1999) are examples of search models with circulation 
of private banknotes. Freeman (1996) and Bullard and Smith (2003b) take on private banknotes in other 
modeling contexts. 
  36Proof of Lemma 2. In Equilibrium ME, λmp=1 and λpp=0 and Pp=1-M, and the 
Bellman equations (1)-(5) are easily summarized as: 
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which q
*>qmp>0 exists iff  Ω(q
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Proof of Lemma 4. Given the results from Lemma 3 and λmc=λmp=0, we can 
write the Bellman equation (4) as Ψ(qmp)=r[qmp+qd(r,M)]-γ=0, where qd(r,M) is part of 






. In order to have qmp>q
* we only need that Ψ(q
*)=r[q
*+qd(r,M)]-γ<0 
(A1). Next, we can check that λmc=0 iff γ/r>q
*+qpp(r,M)+qd(r,M) (A2). Notice that the 
restriction (A1) holds whenever the restriction (A2) also holds.   
 
Proof of Lemma 5. Given the results from Lemma 3, we can write the Bellman 
equation (4) as 
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where qd(r,M) and qpp(r,M) are the solution of a system of equations formed by (21) and 
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  37necessary and sufficient condition to have qmp>q
*. This is equivalent to say 
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Proof of Lemma 6. Given the results from Lemma 3, we can write the Bellman 
equation (4) as 
][ ] } 0 ) , ( ) = − − M r q q pp mp
 
where qd(r,M) and qpp(r,M) are the solution of a system of equations formed by (21) and 
(22). It is easy to prove that  . Consequently, Ω(q
*)>0 is a 
necessary and sufficient condition to have 0<qmp<q
*. This is equivalent to say 
. Finally, it must be 
that λmd=0. This means that  , which is true unless either r or 
M are very big.  
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It is immediate that W .  
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